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Fourth amendment" jurisprudence has been characterized as a ten-
sion between the privacy rights of individuals and the ability of police
officers to enforce the law.2 This tension has led to two methods of
adjudicating disputes.3 One method is to determine the reasonableness
of every search on a case-by-case basis, paying particular attention to
the facts of each case." The second method is to create so-called "bright
lines" by which police officers, courts, and individuals know exactly
what may or may not be searched in any given situation.5
In the area of warrantless searches incident to arrest, the Supreme
Court has established a bright line rule to govern the search of an ar-
restee's vehicle: "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial ar-
rest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that auto-
mobile."6 This search may include a search of any area within the pas-
senger compartment, as well as any containers therein.7
When the Belton rule was first announced, it was met with much
scholarly criticism.8 The criticism either attacked Belton for aban-
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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-23
(1964).
3 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 370 (1974).
4 See, e.g., Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931)
("There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be de-
cided on its own facts and circumstances.").
I See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("We do not
think the long line of authorities of this Court ... requires such a case-by-case
determination.").
6 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
7 See id.
" See Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L.
.(281)
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doning the theoretical underpinnings of the search incident to arrest
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement or predicted
that the bright line would fade by its own logic.
This Comment examines, retrospectively, the effect of New York v.
Belton.' The first section explains the search incident to arrest excep-
tion, the development of bright line rules governing the adjudication of
fourth amendment disputes, and the role that Belton has played in rela-
tion to these. The second section demonstrates, through an analysis of
subsequent case law, that most courts have been able to discern a bright
line applicable to searches of automobiles incident to the arrest of an
occupant. However, courts have not been able to rely on Belton in ad-
judicating disputes concerning searches incident to the arrest of a per-
son who has recently exited an automobile, and have not been able to
confine Belton to the automobile context for which it was designed.
Finally, this Comment suggests that a narrow interpretation of the Bel-
ton rule is the only interpretation that enables both courts and police to
benefit from the bright line rule and at the same time protect the con-
stitutional rights of arrestees.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
The Supreme Court has long recognized an exception to the war-
rant requirement for searches incident to arrest.Y° Over the years, how-
ever, the Court has vacillated over both the permissible scope of the
search and the rationale behind the exception. In Carroll v. United
States," the Court's dicta indicated that the scope of this type of search
included the person and whatever items were in her control.1 2 Later, in
Agnello v. United States,13 the scope was expanded to include both the
person and the place where the arrest was made.14 In the early cases,
the Court justified the search as an "undoubted" right of the govern-
REv. 227, 231 (1984); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On
Drawing "Bright Lines" and Good Faith, 43 U. PiTT. L. REv. 307, 325 (1982);
Note, Robbins and Belton-Inconsistency and Confusion Continue to Reign Supreme
in the Area of Warrantless Vehicle Searches, 19 Hous. L. REv. 527, 548 (1982).
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
10 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 453 (1932); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1924).
l 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
12 See id. at 158.
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
See id. at 30.
[Vol. 136:281
LIMITING NEW YORK v. BELTON
ment incident to arrest.15 In later cases, broad searches were justified
by the incident of the arrest itself; an arrestee's expectation of privacy
was considered to be so diminished by the arrest that the additional
invasion of a search was considered minimal.' 6
While the Court permitted some broad searches as incident to ar-
rest, it rejected others as unreasonable.' These latter cases were distin-
guished by the Court on the basis of whether or not an offense was
actually being committed in the presence of the arresting officers. Thus,
a broad search would be allowed only if the arresting officer actually
saw the commission of an offense. 8 In one of these cases, United States
v. Lejkowitz,' 9 the Court fashioned a rule to enforce its dicta that "[aln
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." 20
The Court also relied on the existence of the warrant process to
invalidate broad searches incident to arrest. Where the arresting officer
could have, but did not, obtain a search warrant, the Court suppressed
evidence as the fruit of an illegal search.2' This approach, however,
was later flatly rejected in United States v. Rabinowitz,22 in which the
Court ruled that the test should not be whether the officers could have
obtained a warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.3
Thus, by 1969, the Court was faced with competing scopes and
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception. One approach al-
lowed broad searches based on the minimal additional invasion that
was caused by a search incident to arrest.24 A second approach relied
on the warrant requirement and a prohibition against pretextual
searches to limit the scope of the search to the area within the arrestee's
control. 25 Faced with this conflict, the Court granted certiorari to decide
Chimel v. California.26
The defendant in Chimel was arrested in the entrance to his home.
Incident to the arrest, the police searched the entire three-bedroom
15 See id.; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950), overruled by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
16 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-67 (1932) (ruling un-
reasonable a warrantless search pursuant to a valid arrest with the sole purpose of
collecting evidence of the alleged crime).
"8 See id. at 463.
19 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
20 Id. at 467.
21 See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1948), overruled by
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
22 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
23 See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66.
24 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
25 See Lejfwwitz, 285 U.S. at 467.
26 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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house, including the attic, garage, and workshop.27 After reviewing the
history of the search incident to arrest exception, the Supreme Court
held that the search was unreasonable.
28
Quoting from Terry v. Ohio,29 the Court noted that "[t]he scope of
[a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible." 30 Here, the only relevant cir-
cumstance was the need to preserve the safety of both the police and
evidence:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable . . . to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the lat-
ter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endan-
gered and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is en-
tirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to pre-
vent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which
an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or eviden-
tiary item must, of course, be governed by a like rule.3
The Court then announced the Chimel rule allowing, incident to
arrest, "a search of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his imme-
diate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
3 2
Thus, Justice Stewart's majority opinion rejected both the notion
that "it is 'reasonable' to search a man's house when he is arrested in
it" 3 and the possibility that a search incident to arrest justified a
search of the entire room in which the arrest took place.34 Rather, the
search was justified only by the need to protect police officers and pre-
serve evidence and was limited to the arrestee and her "grabbing area."
The Court did not abandon its practice of determining the reasonable-
ness of each search upon the facts of each case; it established a rule by
which to measure reasonableness.
27 See id. at 754.
28 See id. at 768.
29 392 U.S. 1 (1969).
20 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
31 Id. at 762-63.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 764-65.
' See id. at 766.
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B. The Development of Bright Line Rules
Bright line rules of adjudication are not unique to the fourth
amendment, and were not unheard of before Chimel.35 They are most
useful when a clear standard is necessary to delineate the limits of law-
ful action or to allocate liability. In the context of the fourth amend-
ment, bright line rules enumerate a certain boundary beyond which
police conduct is unacceptable.
Chimel was decided in 1969, one year after Terry, at a time when
the United States was experiencing social upheaval and questioning the
role of police in society. 6 Indeed, the Terry opinion itself reflected a
concern within the legal community about the risk of police interference
with liberty and personal security." Legal scholars responded to this
societal upheaval by looking to the fourth amendment as a means to
restrict discretionary police conduct. 8 Some commentators viewed the
11 In the area of tort law, for example, Justice Holmes created the "stop and
look" rule of Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), which required
travelers to exit their vehicles at railroad crossings in order to avoid contributory negli-
gence in railroad accidents, observing that "when the standard [of conduct] is clear it
should be laid down once and for all by the Courts." Id. at 70.
Six years later, in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), Justice Cardozo
noted the ineffectiveness of the Goodman rule and limited it to its facts. Because actu-
ally stopping and exiting one's vehicle was an "uncommon precaution," even after Jus-
tice Holmes announced his rule, it could not be used as a standard for liability. Thus,
in tort litigation, the reasonableness test prevailed over the bright line test and railroad
accidents were once again judged according to the specific facts of each case. Id. at 104-
06.
36 See, e.g., J. MICHENER, KENT STATE: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY? (1970)
(discussing social tension and student protests concerning the presence and role of police
on campus).
" See Terry, 392 U.S. at 11-16 & nn. 9, 11 (noting tensions between police and
communities and discussing specific police tactics).
38 Referring to the potential for injustice in allowing police great discretion over
search and seizure decisions and to studies demonstrating this discretion, Professor Am-
sterdam suggested that the police be required to follow clear-cut rules regarding search
and seizure. He believed that these rules, promulgated by either local police or legisla-
tures, and subject to judicial review, would serve several purposes. First, rules would
"provide a pervasive safeguard against arbitrary searches and seizures." Second, rules
could be developed in a manner that was comprehensible to police, and thus would be
followed by police. Third, a system of rules would require that police acted pursuant
thereto, and would prevent prosecutors from attempting to create doctrines by which to
justify police actions. Finally, rules would reduce individual police discretion in the
performance of surveillance activities that are not considered within the constitutional
definition of searches.
Indeed, Amsterdam believed that the best hope of assuring constitutional protec-
tions lay with the promulgation of police-made rules. Officers would be more willing to
follow, and more likely to enforce, rules made by the department itself rather than rules
imposed by courts. Moreover, public deliberation would lead to the development of
higher quality decisions than would ad hoc decisions made by individual officers. Am-
sterdam, supra note 3, at 405-28.
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current state of search and seizure jurisprudence as too confusing to
offer the police any guidance regarding the legality of a search. 9 To
solve the problem of having "a fourth amendment with all of the char-
acter and consistency of a Rorschach blot,"40 many commentators urged
that bright line rules be promulgated to guide police conduct.41
The commentators found clear-cut rules of adjudication necessary
for several reasons. First, the possibility of discriminatory or arbitrary
treatment of different citizens in similar situations, inherent in a system
that allows great police discretion, was intolerable. Bright line rules,
created by and for police, would limit police discretion and guarantee
fair and equal treatment.42 Second, Supreme Court decisions that aban-
doned specific, articulable criteria for determining the propriety of a
search left police uncertain about the proper scope of their authority.
Rules would specifically delineate that scope.43 Third, lower courts
needed guidance in defining what searches were reasonable in order to
avoid constantly deferring to the judgment of the arresting officers, in
effect allowing the police to define, ad hoc, the limits of their author-
ity.44 Finally, the Supreme Court itself needed clear-cut rules of rea-
sonableness in order to avoid the "fact-style" adjudication that had pro-
vided the lower courts with so little guidance.45
11 See id. at 405.
40 Id. at 375.
41 Starting from the premise that "[tihe fourth amendment exists to control the
government," Professor Dworkin argued that "[t]o effectively deter police misconduct
the Court must develop inflexible categories and clear rules." Dworkin, Fact Style Ad-
judication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329,
344 (1973). He suggested that rules would be workable and effective in the search and
seizure situation, unlike the railroad crossing situation, see supira note 35, because po-
lice searches are not the stuff of ordinary life for most citizens. This was a context,
Dworkin argued, where the ordinary conduct of citizens could not override the standard
of conduct developed by the courts. See Dworkin, supra, at 365-66.
42 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
"' Judge McGowan argued that the increased participation of police in the crea-
tion of rules to guide their conduct would help ensure the conviction of guilty suspects.
See McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659, 662-64 (1972).
Because the police officers themselves had a greater amount of expertise in arrest situa-
tions than legislatures or judges, McGowan suggested that they be encouraged to for-
mulate departmental rules, subject to judicial review, to govern their conduct. See id. at
664. He viewed this as a solution to both the undesirability of ad hoc decisionmaking
by officers on the street and to the common complaint that police "are shackled by
restrictive and unrealistic judicial mandates" in their efforts to prevent crime. Id. at
662.
44 See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 415; McGowan, supra note 43, at 640.
4' Dworkin believed that clear-cut rules were necessary to guide the Supreme
Court in its adjudication of fourth amendment disputes. He argued that principles and
rules would rescue the court from making binding precedential decisions based upon
fact patterns about which the Court made subjective value judgments concerning rea-
sonableness. See Dworkin, supra note 41, at 344, 366. Rather, the Court should ad-
dress itself to "the broad question of how privacy compares to order, with an eye to the
[Vol. 136:281
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The call for bright line rules was not ignored by the Supreme
Court. The Chimel decision did not establish any per se rules about
reasonableness; it merely established a guideline by which police and
courts could measure the validity of a search. In the years that fol-
lowed, however, several specific bright line rules were created. In
United States v. Robinson,4 the Court upheld the validity of a search
of the interior of a cigarette package discovered during the search of a
person incident to his arrest. The Court held that, incident to a lawful
custodial arrest for any violation, "a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment. '47 In
Gustafson v. Florida,48 the Court made clear that this rule applied to
valid arrests made at the discretion of the officer as well as those made
pursuant to department policy.4
In 1981, the Court was faced with its first opportunity to define
"the area within the immediate control" of an arrestee. That case, New
York v. Belton,50 created a per se rule governing searches of
automobiles made incident to the arrest of occupants.
C. New York v. Belton
In Belton, state police trooper Douglas Nicot stopped a vehicle for
speeding. While examining the driver's license and the registration of
the car, the officer smelled the odor of burned marijuana and noticed
an envelope marked "Supergold," which he suspected contained mari-
juana, on the floor of the car. Trooper Nicot directed the four occu-
pants to exit the vehicle, patted each down, and instructed them to
stand in separate areas of the highway. Nicot found marijuana in the
envelope and arrested the occupants for possession of marijuana. He
then searched the passenger compartment of the car and found cocaine
in the zipped pocket of a black leather jacket belonging to passenger
Roger Belton.51
Both the trial court and the Appellate Division of the New York
State Supreme Court denied .Belton's motion to suppress the cocaine,
reasoning that the search was justified as incident to his lawful arrest.52
development of categories and rules as specific as possible to govern fourth amendment
cases, .. ." Id. at 366.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
47 Id. at 235.
4- 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
41 See id. at 263-65.
50 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
5, See id. at 455-56.
52 See id. at 456.
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The New York Court of Appeals reversed. Citing Chimel, the state's
high court held that a warrantless search is not incident to arrest
"where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate
might gain access to the article."53
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Quoting Professor
LaFave, the Court noted that "the protection of the Fourth . . .
Amendment[]. . . 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a
set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a cor-
rect determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interests of law enforcement.' "5 It then noted that
lower court decisions, both state and federal, were badly divided over
the issue of the proper scope of a warrantless search of the interior of
an automobile incident to the arrest of one of its occupants.55 The
Court reasoned that if courts could not define the scope of a proper
search, then individuals could not know the scope of their rights, and
police could not know the limits of their authority.56
Hoping to remedy this situation, the Court fashioned a bright line
rule allowing the contemporaneous search of the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle, and any open or closed containers found therein,
incident to the arrest of one of its occupants.57 The announced rule was
not intended to alter "the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful
custodial arrests."58 Rather, it was merely an interpretation of Chimel's
requirement in the "particular and problematic context" of
automobiles.59
Justice White dissented from the judgment of the Court. He as-
serted that, "[a]s to luggage, briefcases, or other containers, this seems
to me an extreme extension of Chimel . . . 2 0 Justice White would
not allow a search of containers in the automobile absent "any suspi-
cion whatsoever" that they contained contraband or evidence of a
crime.61 He did not, however, dissent specifically from the creation of a
bright line rule.
11 People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574,
575 (1980).
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Ver-
sus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127,
142).
5 See id. at 459.
5 See id. at 459-60.
See id. at 460.
88 Id. at 460 n.3.
Id.
60 Id. at 472 (White, J., dissenting).
I1 d. (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan dissented from both the judgment of the Court
and the recognition of a bright line rule. He attacked the Court's "fic-
tion-that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control
of an arrestee who has recently been in the car" 6 -on two grounds.
First, he argued that the Court dangerously expanded the search inci-
dent to arrest requirement beyond the concerns underlying Chimel. He
asserted that in this case, "the Court for the first time grants police
officers authority to conduct a warrantless 'area' search under circum-
stances where there is no chance that the arrestee 'might gain posses-
sion of a weapon or destructible evidence.' "63 Second, Justice Brennan
considered the announced bright line to fail on its own terms. He pre-
dicted that it would leave too many unanswered questions and provide
too little guidance to police and courts in answering those questions:
Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless
search of a car may take place even though the suspect was
arrested outside the car, it does not indicate how long after
the suspect's arrest that search may validly be conducted.
Would a warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if con-
ducted five minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty
minutes? Three hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is
standing in close proximity to the car when the search is
conducted? Does it matter whether the police formed proba-
ble cause to arrest before or after the suspect left his car?
And why is the rule announced today necessarily limited to
searches of cars? What if a suspect is seen walking out of a
house where the police, peering in from outside, had formed
probable cause to believe a crime was being committed?
Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter the house
to conduct a search incident to arrest? Even assuming today's
rule is limited to searches of the "interior" of cars-an as-
sumption not demanded by logic-what is meant by "inte-
rior"? Does it include locked glove compartments, the inte-
rior of door panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are
special rules necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks,
where the luggage compartment may be reached through the
interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the
driver's compartment from the rest of the car? Are the only
containers that may be searched those that are large enough
to be "capable of holding another object"? Or does the new
62 Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1S Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
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rule apply to any container, even if it "could hold neither a
weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the
suspect was arrested"?
6 4
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment of the Court but re-
ferred to his dissent in Robbins v. California5 for his opinion regard-
ing warrantless searches of automobiles. In that opinion, Justice Rehn-
quist had argued that no bright line would suffice as a rule of fourth
amendment jurisprudence and predicted that bright lines must fail:
"Our entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines' the way hounds
attack foxes. Acceptance by the courts of arguments that one thing is
the 'functional equivalent' of the other, for example, soon breaks down
what might have been a bright line into a blurry impressionistic
pattern." 66
Belton, therefore, was a decision relating not only to the scope of
the search incident to arrest exception, but to the validity of bright line
rules as well. The scholarly commentary that followed the decision at-
tacked it on both grounds.
D. The Post-Belton Criticism
One complaint of the commentators was that the Belton decision
abandoned the theoretical underpinnings of the search incident to arrest
doctrine. "In Belton, the Court has turned its back on the logic of its
earlier decision in Chimel v. California, which restricted police
searches incident to arrest to the arrestee's immediate area of con-
trol."67 The truth of this assertion is demonstrated most vividly by the
implausibility of the presumption that an arrestee who is handcuffed in
a patrol car could gain control of destructible evidence hidden in the
glove compartment of her own vehicle.6 8
Professor Alschuler, eschewing bright lines in general, found the
outcome of Belton particularly ill-advised. Rather than allowing the
police to search the passenger compartment of every arrestee's vehicle,
he would create quite the opposite rule: "[T]he occupants almost inva-
Id. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 453 U.S. 420, 437-44 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Robbins was decided
on the same day as Belton.
6 Id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67 The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 260 (1981) (citation
omitted).
68 See Latzer, Searching Cars and Their Contents: United States v. Ross, 18
CRIM. L. BULL. 381, 397 (1982). While the presumption may be implausible, most
courts that have addressed the question have considered the vehicles of arrestees in such
situations to be subject to warrantless searches incident to arrest. See infra notes 90-92
and accompanying text.
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riably are removed before an automobile is searched; and once they
have been removed, there is no longer much chance that they can secure
weapons from the automobile or destroy evidence there." 9 Thus, the
more appropriate rule would be to require removal of the arrestee from
the car but prohibit a search of the interior.
Other commentators accepted the result in Belton, but opposed the
bright line rule. Even Professor LaFave, whose argument supporting
bright line rules was quoted in the Belton decision,70 criticized its ap-
plication. LaFave did not agree with Justice Brennan that the opinion
left too many unanswered questions regarding the scope of the search
in the interior of the car; he respoAded that the search should include
only those areas that could be reached from inside the car.71 He was,
however, worried by the unanswered questions of "proximity".
[W]hat the case does not reveal is whether at the time of
the search the arrestee must have at least some proximity to
the vehicle in the sense of being on the scene, or whether, as
was customarily permitted under [Preston v. United
States,72] the car may be searched at the scene of the arrest
even after the arrestee has been taken to the station. If Bel-
ton is interpreted as having abandoned the presumably diffi-
cult-to-apply "immediate control" test of Chimel in favor of
a "bright line," then the argument will certainly be made
that an on-the-scene requirement is appropriate as the near-
est available "bright line." 3
Although LaFave was satisfied that the Belton decision provided
some guidance as to timing and the physical proximity of the vehicle to
the arrestee,74 other commentators were not convinced. "It is unclear
whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception applies when . . . the
arrestee has been outside the vehicle for a considerable length of time,
or when the arrestee is no longer near the vehicle."
'75
Additionally, some commentators predicted that neither police nor
courts could draw a clear line to contain the Belton exception to
searches of automobiles. One questioned how a policeman could distin-
69 Alschuler, supra note 8, at 274.
70 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
71 See LaFave, supra note 8, at 327 n. 114. LaFave's approach has been followed
by the courts. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
72 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
73 LaFave, supra note 8, at 327 n.114.
74 See id.
75 Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger
Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 139 (1982)(citations
omitted).
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guish between the search of a backpack on the rear seat of a car occu-
pied only by the driver and the search of a backpack left on the ground
a few feet away from a hitchhiker.7 6 Likewise, there were predictions
that the exception would spill over to lunch boxes in factories, filing
cabinets in offices, duffel bags in Winnebagos, and jackets on living
room sofas."
Finally, the Belton bright line was attacked as subject to abuse by
police officers hoping to find a pretext to search a suspect's vehicle.
Assuming that the police had probable cause to arrest a suspect, but no
probable cause to search her vehicle, they could merely wait for the
suspect to enter her car and begin to drive away. If she were arrested
twenty yards down the road, the passenger compartment of her car
would be subject to a warrantless search.
7
1
In response to the Supreme Court's rule, several commentators
have suggested that state courts should interpret their own state consti-
tutions to be more restrictive of police conduct than the federal Consti-
tution. Some suggested that the Belton rule be abandoned completely
and the Chimel rule of immediate control be continued in its pre-Belton
form.719 Others suggested that the rule be modified to allow only war-
rantless seizure of the car or the containers therein, thus prohibiting
warrantless searches."0
In the six years that have passed since the Belton decision, several
states have had the opportunity to evaluate the bright line rule. Most of
the states that have considered the rule have accepted it;8 the others
11 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 282-83.
7 See Note, Robbins, Belton and Ross: Reconsideration of "Bright Line" Rules
for Warrantless Container Searches, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529, 541 & n.83 (1982).
For a discussion of how the Belton rule has been extended beyond the context of
automobiles, see infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
78 See Note, supra note 77, at 558. For a discussion of pretextual use of the Bel-
ton rule in order to allow a search, see infra notes 182-96 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68
VA. L. REV. 1085, 1132-36 (1982).
s See, e.g., Note, supra note 75, at 560.
s See Johnson v. State, 406 So. 2d 446, 448 (Ala. Grim. App. 1981); State v.
Hersch, 135 Ariz. 528, 531, 662 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1982); Baxter v. State, 274 Ark.
539, 542, 626 S.W.2d 935, 937, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118 (1982); People v. Henry,
631 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Colo. 1981); Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del. 1983);
State v. Anders, 407 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Boyd v. State, 168 Ga.
App. 246, 249, 308 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1983); State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 530, 661
P.2d 311, 315 (1983); People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 217, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984); Doe v. State, 451 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Iowa 1981); State v. White, 230 Kan.
679, 680, 640 P.2d 1231, 1232 (1982); State v. Lamare, 463 A.2d 279, 280 (Me.
1983); Farrow v. State, 68 Md. App. 519, 528, 514 A.2d 35, 39 (1986), cert. denied,
308 Md. 382, 519 A.2d 1283 (1987); People v. Miller, 128 Mich. App. 298, 305, 340
N.W.2d 858, 861 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943 (1984); State v. Liljedahl, 327
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have either rejected or modified the Supreme Court's rule. 2 One of the
first states to reject the rule of New York v. Belton was New York. On
remand from the Supreme Court, the New York State Court of Ap-
peals rejected, under the state constitution, the bright line rule as a
method of determining the propriety of a search. Instead, the Court
relied upon the fact that Trooper Nicot could smell marijuana in the
car and considered the cocaine found in Belton's jacket pocket to be the
fruit of a search authorized by probable cause.8" Likewise, courts in
California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington have rejected or
modified the Belton rule. 4
N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. 1982); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d 1197, 1198-99 (Miss. 1982);
State v. Harvey, 648 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); State v. Roth, 213 Neb.
900, 903, 331 N.W.2d 819, 821 (1983), affd, 217 Neb. 80, 80, 348 N.W.2d 125, 125
(1984); State v. Kearney, 183 N.J. Super. 13, 20, 443 A.2d 214, 217 (1981), certif.
denied, 89 N.J. 449, 446 A.2d 169 (1982); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 705, 286
S.E.2d 102, 104 (1982); Nealy v. State, 636 P.2d 378, 381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981);
State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D. 1982); State v. Cabage, 649 S.W.2d 589,
591-92 (Tenn. 1983); Alexander v. State, 629 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981);
State ex rel. K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210,
216, 436 A.2d 746, 749 (1981); State v. Boswell, 294 S.E.2d 287, 295 (W. Va. 1981);
State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 168, 388 N.W.2d 565, 571-72 (1986); Lopez v. State,
643 P.2d 682, 685 (Wyo. 1982).
" See Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 160-61, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266
(1983) (noting that Massachusetts statutory law places a greater restriction on police
activity than does the federal Constitution); People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 51, 432
N.E.2d 745, 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1982) (rejecting, on remand from the Su-
preme Court, the Court's bright line rule); State v. Kirsch, 69 Or. App. 418, 422, 686
P.2d 446, 448 (1984) (declaring that Belton is not the law in Oregon); State v. Stroud,
106 Wash. 2d 144, 151-52, 720 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1986) (recognizing a different bright
line rule than the one announced by the Supreme Court in Belton).
Some states have neither accepted nor rejected Belton. See State v. Ortiz, 67 Haw.
181, 183 n.2, 683 P.2d 822, 825 n.2 (1984) (acknowledging, but declining to apply, the
Belton rule). Courts in California have both accepted and rejected Belton without a
clear statement of law from the state's highest court. Compare People v. Gasteiger, 180
Cal. Rptr. 704, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1982) (following Belton) with Miller v. Superior
Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 494, 506, 179 Cal. Rptr. 783, 790 (1981) (stating that Belton
is not the law in California).
83 See Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 55, 432 N.E.2d. at 748, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
I" See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
The lack of congruence between state and federal constitutional law regarding the
validity of searches gives rise to the possibility of a modern "silver platter" problem. In
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960), the United States Supreme
Court held that evidence obtained by state officers in violation of the federal Constitu-
tion was not admissible in federal courts. Thus, evidence given to federal law enforce-
ment agencies "on a silver platter" could not be used.
A modern version of this problem may be seen in the prospect of state officials
obtaining evidence in violation of state law and admitting that evidence into federal
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1983)
("Whether information secured by state officers entirely without federal involvement
should be admissible notwithstanding violations of state law is a question that remains
undecided."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218 (1984). But see United States v. Loggins, 777
F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The fact that Michigan law may . . . require greater
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Belton, therefore, must be evaluated on three levels. First, it must
be seen in light of the reasons supporting its adoption by the Supreme
Court. Second, it can be viewed as a response to the scholarly argu-
ments in favor of clear-cut rules to guide the police and courts in ad-
ministering and interpreting the fourth amendment. Third, the rule can
be evaluated in terms of the dissent's and critics' dire predictions con-
cerning its implementation.
If Belton has succeeded, it would have created a workable rule
that can be relied on by both police and judges. The next section of this
Comment will evaluate the ability of courts to define the scope of the
rule, limit its application to factual situations similar but not identical
to that in Belton, and refrain from extending its application to situa-
tions in which no automobile is involved.
II. Belton IN THE COURTS
New York v. Belton 6 was intended to guide lower courts in the
evaluation of vehicle searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant
of the vehicle."6 Criticism at the time Belton was decided suggested that
lower courts would not be able to follow the Belton rule when adjudi-
cating disputes involving automobile-related arrests, would not be able
to confine the rule to automobile situations, and would allow police to
use the Belton decision to create a "free search" zone under the pretext
of lawful arrest.17 Subsequent case law has proven the second and third
predictions to be correct. Courts have neither been able successfully to
contain Belton to automobile searches nor have they been able to pre-
vent police from using the rule as a pretext for conducting otherwise
unacceptable automobile searches."' The first prediction, however, was
incorrect: the Belton rule has been a bright line standard applicable to
automobiles.
protection against searches and seizures is of no avail to a defendant in a federal court,
under prosecution for a federal crime."); United States v. Nelligan, 573 F.2d 251, 253
(5th Cir. 1978) ("[Flederal law governs the admissibility of tape recordings in federal
criminal cases . . .[regardless of whether] a state agent rather than a federal agent is
.. . alleged to have violated the state statute." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Gervasi, 562 F. Supp 632, 648, 650-51 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("[E]vidence obtained by state
officials in violation of state law [is] admissible in a federal proceeding if the evidence
was not obtained in violation of federal law."). An extensive examination of this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
85 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
88 See id. at 459-60.
87 See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 148-90 and accompanying text.
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A. Automobile Searches
1. The Definition of "Contemporaneous"
Critics predicted that the bright line would fade as soon as police
officers attempted to carry out searches "contemporaneous" with the
arrest of an occupant of a car. Professor Alschuler noted that police
officers often remove an arrestee from a vehicle in order to search it
properly, thus every search pursuant to Belton would "almost invaria-
bly" involve an arrestee who is not actually in the car.89 The question
that courts were left to answer was how close to the car the arrestee
must be standing in order for the search to retain the urgency that
justifies it.
Justice Brennan's dissent provided the answer. "Under the ap-
proach taken today, the result would presumably be the same even if
Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol
car before placing them under arrest . ... -"o Although Brennan did
not consider this result to be desirable, many courts have in fact agreed
with it as a statement of the law. These courts have interpreted Belton
to mean that instead of evaluating each custodial arrest from a vehicle,
a court need only find that an article was within the passenger com-
partment to determine that it was within an arrestee's immediate con-
trol."1 Thus, most state and federal courts have upheld the validity of
the search of an automobile incident to the arrest of a recent occupant,
even when the arrestee is handcuffed in the patrol car at the time of the
search.9 2
A few courts, however, "have read Belton more narrowly, and
have found it not to apply to searches made while the defendant was
arrested, handcuffed, and seated in the back seat of an [F.B.I.] agent's
car without possibility of access to his own vehicle." ' In United States
" See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 274.
90 Belton, 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., State v. Press, 9 Kan. App. 2d 589, 594, 685 P.2d 887, 891 (1984).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1985); State
v. Hersch, 135 Ariz. 528, 530-31, 662 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1983); Baxter v. State, 274
Ark. 539, 542, 626 S.W.2d 935, 936 (1982); People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122, 1125
(Colo. 1981); State v. Valdes, 423 So. 2d 944, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 141-42, 293 S.E.2d 529, 529 (1982); People v. Loftus,
111 111. App. 3d 978, 980, 444 N.E.2d 834, 836 (1983); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d
1197, 1198 (Miss. 1982); State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626, 627, 465 A.2d 919, 920
(1983); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 705-06, 286 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1982); State v.
Hall, 631 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210,
214-15, 436 A.2d 746, 748-49 (1981); State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 158, 388 N.W.2d
565, 567 (1986).
93 Press, 9 Kan. App. 2d at 594, 685 P.2d 887, 891 (1984); see also People v.
Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1982) (search of as yet unarrested
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v. Farinacci-Garcia,94 the arrestee was handcuffed in the patrol car,
but the search of his vehicle took place as one of the officers drove the
arrestee's car away from the scene of the arrest. The District Court
rejected the search as not contemporaneous to the arrest.95 Similarly, in
State v. Badgett,98 the Connecticut Supreme Court found that a search
lost its characterization as contemporaneous the moment that the de-
fendant left the scene in a patrol car.9 Thus, even under the narrow
interpretation, a search will be considered contemporaneous so long as
both the arrestee and the car are still at the scene of the arrest.
Some cases, however, have extended Belton even beyond the ma-
jority interpretation that allows searches of automobiles while the ar-
restee is handcuffed in the patrol car. For example, in Smith v. United
States,98 the arresting officer drove the defendant in the patrol car from
the scene of the investigatory stop to the scene of the crime, a few
blocks away. Another officer drove the defendant's car to the scene of
the crime. After the victims identified the defendant as the perpetrator
of the crime, he was formally arrested, and the police searched the ve-
hicle. The Appellate Court for the District of Columbia upheld the
search as contemporaneous to the arrest under Belton.99 Likewise, in
State v. Blair,100 the defendants were arrested on the highway for pass-
ing counterfeit currency, and one defendant was allowed to drive the
car to the police station while the other defendant was taken there in
the police cruiser. The defendants' car was not searched at the scene of
the arrest but was instead searched at the station. The court upheld the
search as reasonable: "[The defendants] were under a lawful custodial
arrest at the time of search. We do not think the fact the car was
searched after [one defendant] drove it to the station rather than being
searched on the roadside makes Belton inapplicable to this case."'01
The Blair type of interpretation demonstrates the danger of the
Belton decision: it is extremely difficult to limit it to the context in
which it was decided. Because the Blair court could perceive no logical
defendant's car was unjustified because he was "under the control" of police while it
was being conducted).
" 551 F. Supp. 465 (D.P.R. 1982).
15 See id. at 471.
" 200 Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 423 (1986).
97 See id. at 428, 512 A.2d at 169.
98 435 A.2d 1066 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
"I See id. at 1069.
1-0 632 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982).
101 Id. at 569; see also State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 530, 661 P.2d 311, 315
(1983) (upholding a station house search of a suitcase because the suitcase could have
been, but was not, searched at the scene under Belton); State v. Helfrich, 33 Wash.
App. 338, 340, 656 P.2d 506, 508 (1982) (upholding a search of a vehicle made after
the arresting officer drove it, with the arrestee's permission, to the station house).
[Vol. 136:281
LIMITING NEW YORK v. BELTON
distinction between the exigencies present when a defendant is hand-
cuffed in a patrol car and her vehicle is searched at the scene and those
present when a defendant is handcuffed at the station after driving
there in her vehicle, it blurred the bright line in order to encompass the
latter situation. Although one situation may arguably be the "func-
tional equivalent"10 2 of the other, the courts must follow a clear defini-
tion of what is a valid search incident to arrest. If the Court refuses to
limit the Belton rule, its extension to tenuously related fact patterns
will cause courts to admit evidence that could not be admitted under
Chimel.
2. The Definition of "Recent"
The degree to which a search is contemporaneous with arrest is
not the only temporal relationship that courts were left to interpret
when implementing the Belton decision. The second relationship relates
to how recently an arrestee must have been an occupant of the vehicle
in order to allow a vehicle search. In this context, lower courts have
been able neither to rely on the logic of the Supreme Court nor to come
to a consensus of their own.
The Belton case involved the arrest of four people who were in the
vehicle at the time of the arrest.103 In its decision, the Court held that
"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile, he may . . . search the passenger compartment."'4
This holding has left lower courts with no guidance in cases in which
the arrestee was not arrested in her car, when probable cause for the
arrest was formed after the defendant exited her car, or when the de-
fendant purposely exited and locked her car before the police could ap-
proach it.
It is clear that where a defendant has been outside of the vehicle
for several hours before her arrest, Belton does not authorize a search
of the vehicle.1 5 It should be equally clear that Belton does not apply
102 Cf Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that by accepting the concept of functional equivalence, courts are turning
clear distinctions into gray uncertainties).
o See Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1981).
104 Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
105 See State v. Vanderhorst, 419 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(Belton does not authorize a search where the defendant had been outside of his car for
two and one-half hours before the arrest.); see also Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411,
413-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (Belton does not authorize a search where
the defendant had been out of his vehicle for over an hour and had been arrested inside
a bar and brought outside to the parking lot.); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411
(Utah 1984) (Belton does not authorize a search of a defendant's vehicle executed
before defendant was on the scene.).
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when the defendant is afested inside a building and the car is outside.
Indeed, the Criminal Appeals Court of Texas has so held.'0 6 However,
the same court that year refused to grant a petition for appellate review
where a lower court upheld the search of a defendant's vehicle as con-
temporaneous to his arrest inside a nearby building. The vehicle was
twenty to thirty feet away from the building at the time of the arrest,
and the only appellate judge to speak on the matter found no probable
cause for the search.0 7
The most difficult question in this area is whether a search is valid
as incident to arrest when the defendants exit and walk away from
their vehicle before the police approach it. The Ninth Circuit has
strictly interpreted the bright line rationale of Belton. 08 Reasoning that
the Supreme Court stretched the Chimel'09 standard only to a specifi-
cally limited extent, and that allowing any search beyond that extent
would create additional uncertainties, the Ninth Circuit has refused to
extend Belton beyond the factual situation of a search of the passenger
compartment of a car when an occupant is arrested." Thus, when the
arrestee is a recent occupant of an automobile, but was arrested after
exiting the automobile, the Ninth Circuit will not allow a Belton search
of containers removed from the vehicle prior to the arrest. For example,
in United States v. Vaughan,"' two men were arrested, pursuant to a
warrant, after they exited the car. Vaughan also exited the car, carry-
ing his briefcase, but was not immediately arrested. Although ordered
by the police to "freeze," he started to walk away, still carrying the
briefcase. The police then detained Vaughan, searched his briefcase,
and discovered incriminating evidence." 2 Because neither Vaughan nor
his briefcase were in the car at the time of the arrest, the search of
Vaughan's briefcase was not covered by Belton as a search incident to
his arrest, and the court excluded the evidence."'
Other courts disagree. In People v. Ragland,"" the defendant tes-
tified that after being pulled over by the police, he stopped his car,
immediately exited the vehicle, and locked the door behind him. He
was outside the vehicle when he was arrested for driving without a
'o6 See Gauldin, 683 S.W.2d at 414.
107 See Jenkins v. State, 689 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc)
(Teague, J., dissenting).
108 See United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 333 (9th Cir. 1983).
109 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
110 See Vaughan, 718 F.2d at 333-34.
718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983).
12 See id. at 333.
1 See id. at 334-36.
114 149 Mich. App. 277, 385 N.W.2d 772 (1986).
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-license and initially refused to give his keys to the arresting officer. The
officer searched the defendant, took the keys, and then searched the
car."" The court did not make a finding regarding the truth of the
defendant's assertion that he was outside of the locked vehicle at the
time of the arrest; rather, it considered the defendant's own version of
the facts to be within the scope of the Belton rule. Relying on the Su-
preme Court's attempt to articulate "an objective test based on proxim-
ity in time and space of the search to the arrest,""1 6 the Court of Ap-
peals of Michigan upheld the search as a valid search incident to arrest.
In Ragland, the police stopped the defendant for driving errati-
cally; they did not have any reason to arrest him until they determined
that he was driving without a license. Thus, probable cause was estab-
lished after he exited his car. In People v. Miller,"7 however, the po-
lice had sufficient cause for an investigatory stop after observing the
defendants engaging in suspicious behavior late at night. When the po-
lice drove up behind the defendants' vehicle, the defendants exited and
began walking in opposite directions. The officers instructed the de-
fendants to return to the vicinity of the car, arrested them after observ-
ing a handgun in plain view in the car, and then searched the car inci-
dent to the arrest. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the
propriety of the search under Belton." 8
Likewise, in State v. McClendon,"" the District Court of Appeals
of Florida relied on the Supreme Court's attempt to set forth a
"straightforward, workable rule" in upholding the validity of a war-
rantless search of an arrestee's truck. 20 In Mc~lendon, however, the
defendant was not arrested in his truck. Instead, he was apprehended
twenty to thirty feet away, inside a service station. An Arkansas state
police officer had acted on information from a Florida sheriff's office
that the defendant would be at a certain location at a specific time.
After following the defendant in his truck to the service station where
he was expected to stop, the police officer noticed that McClendon had
exited the vehicle and attempted to place a telephone call. McClendon
was arrested about three minutes after he entered the service station .
2'
The Florida court noted the Supreme Court's desire to eliminate the
15 See id. at 280, 385 N.W.2d at 773.
116 Id. at 282, 385 N.W.2d at 774.
117 128 Mich. App. 298, 340 N.W.2d 858 (1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 943 (1984).
118 See id. at 299-305, 340 N.W.2d at 859-61.
"9 490 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam), rev. denied, 500 So.
2d 544 (Fla. 1986).
120 See id. at 1309.
121 See id. at 1308-09.
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need for case-by-case evaluation of whether the interior of an automo-
bile is subject to the search incident to arrest exception and reasoned
that distinguishing between arrests of persons who have recently va-
cated a car and persons who are inside a car would "severely diminish
the purpose of the Belton decision."' 22
These decisions, of course, demonstrate a fundamental failure of
the Belton rule. Different courts have used the reasoning of the Belton
decision-the need to create a workable bright line rule-to find sup-
port for directly conflicting results. In this area, B elton fails to guide
police conduct, fails to provide citizens with an idea of the scope of
their rights, and fails to ensure consistent results.
Belton may be seen as a decision that allows a search of the pas-
senger compartment contemporaneous to the arrest of a passenger be-
cause weapons or evidence are always accessible to arrestees and are
therefore always within the Chimel grabbing area. Conversely, it may
be seen as a decision that per se allows such searches because of the
difficulty for police and courts of making the factual determination
about when the contents of an automobile are accessible to arrestees.
The implausibility of an arrestee breaking loose of her restraints and
gaining access to evidence while she is locked in the back seat of a
patrol car demonstrates that the former rationale cannot be the basis for
the Belton decision. It is evident that not all searches authorized by
Belton will be searches of areas that an arrestee can reach. Thus, it is
simply a bright line, created in order to guide police and courts in mak-
ing swift, simple, and consistent decisions. This must be seen as the
rationale behind Belton.
There are several ways to define recency of occupancy that protect
the bright line rule. Courts might restrict permissible searches to only
those incident to arrests of persons who are actually in vehicles. Thus, a
search would not be valid under Belton if the sole occupant of a vehicle
was pulled over on the road, exited the vehicle, closed and locked the
door, and then was arrested by the police officer. The arrestee could
not gain access to weapons or destructible evidence contained in the
vehicle and the officer could not perform a warrantless search without
probable cause. The officer would be able to perform a Belton search,
however, if the arrestee were not the sole occupant of the car and her
companions remained inside the car. In such a situation, the officer
could presume that the companions might reach for weapons or evi-
dence and thus the search would be valid. This definition would protect
both the underlying interests of the search incident to arrest exception
122 Id. at 1310.
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and individual privacy interests.
A second option that would protect the bright line would be to
allow a search of a vehicle only if the officer had probable cause to
arrest while the defendant was in the vehicle. If an officer detained a
vehicle pursuant to an arrest warrant or after a high speed chase, she
would be able to search the vehicle regardless of whether the defendant
ran from the car after being stopped. This option, however, merely
changes the decision that the officer must make from whether an arres-
tee could reach evidence to whether probable cause existed before or
after the arrestee exited the vehicle. In difficult cases, it would not be a
simple factual determination that could guide officers and courts in
their enforcement and administration of the law.
Only the first definition protects the bright line of the Belton case,
protects the law enforcement interests underlying Chimel, and adheres
to the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. It is,
therefore, the best choice for this situation. Courts should uphold Bel-
ton searches only when the defendant is arrested while she, or a com-
panion, is actually in the car.
3. Scope of the Search
Most courts have not found it difficult to determine the proper
scope of the search of the passenger compartment of the car. Professor
LaFave accurately predicted that this would not be an unanswerable
question. 123 He suggested that all areas that could be reached from in-
side the car would be subject to the search incident to arrest exception
but areas that could only be reached if the passenger exited the car
would not.12
Thus, courts have found that a Belton search may include the
glove compartment, 25 hatchback, 26 front seat, 27 console, 2 8 floor areas
under the floor mats,1 29 and any containers brought out of the vehicle
by the arrestee.130 A search may not include the area behind the door
panel that cannot be reached without removing the rear seat of the
123 See LaFave, supra note 8, at 327.
124 See id. at 327 n.114.
125 See State v. Bell, 195 N.J. Super. 49, 53, 58, 477 A.2d 1272, 1274, 1277
(App. Div. 1984).
128 See United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323, 327 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1108 (1982).
127 See United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
128 See United States v. Henry, 763 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1985).
129 See Thomas v. State, 415 So. 2d 1246, 1248-49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
130 See State v. Evans, 181 N.J. Super. 455, 461, 438 A.2d 340, 343 (App. Div.
1981).
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car.1"1 In addition, if the hatchback is inaccessible from the interior of
the car, it cannot be searched under Belton." 2
A more difficult question for the courts has been the validity of a
search of a passenger in the same car as the arrestee. In State v.
Peck,"'3 drugs were discovered on the person of a passenger in a car in
which the driver was arrested for driving without a license. The major-
ity of the North Carolina Supreme Court admitted the evidence based
on a Terry"' stop rationale: "a reasonably prudent man in the circum-
stances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger." 3 5 In a concurring opinion, Justice Mitchell noted that
he would rest the decision on both a Terry stop and a search incident to
arrest rationale. He argued that, pursuant to arrest of the driver, the
officer could have conducted a thorough search of any packages or
clothing in the vehicle, including those belonging to the passenger:
To hold that Belton would not also authorize at least a
"frisk" or "pat down" of a passenger in the same automobile
would seem to me to create an anomaly in the law of search
and seizure and draw the sort of fine distinction far more
useful to students in a classroom than to law enforcement
officers conducting searches of automobiles on our public
streets at night. 36
Some courts have, however, drawn such distinctions. Both the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have refused to allow a Belton search of pas-
sengers who were not arrested but who were riding in the car with the
arrestee. In Vaughan, the defendant was a passenger in a car in which
two other occupants were arrested pursuant to warrants. The officers
had neither a warrant nor probable cause for Vaughan's arrest.13 7 Re-
lying on Ybarra v. Illinois,"8" the Ninth Circuit noted that "[tihe fact
that he was in the company of persons for whom a warrant had been
issued does not constitute probable cause." ''"9 Thus, although the of-
1"1 See State v. Cuellar, 211 N.J. Super. 299, 303-04, 511 A.2d 745, 748 (Law
Div.), affd per curiam, 216 N.J. Super. 249, 523 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1986).
13 See State v. Berrios, 478 So. 2d 890, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per
curiam).
133 305 N.C. 734, 291 S.E.2d 637 (1982).
134 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing a limited search, based on less
than probable cause, of the clothing of persons that a police officer believes to be armed
and dangerous).
13' Peck, 305 N.C. at 742, 291 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
138 Id. at 743-44, 291 S.E.2d at 643 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
137 See Vaughan, 718 F.2d at 334.
138 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
139 Vaughan, 718 F.2d at 334 n.5.
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ficers could prevent Vaughan from walking away, they could not search
him. The court would, however, allow a limited Terry stop after
Vaughan twice tried to walk away.
14
1
The Sixth Circuit would not even allow a Terry stop in the typical
search incident to arrest situation. In United States v. Bell,"' the court
declined to adopt an "automatic companion" rule, which would allow
the search of a passenger: "[W]e do not believe that the Terry require-
ment of reasonable suspicion under the circumstances . . . has been
eroded to the point that an individual may be frisked based upon noth-
ing more than an unfortunate choice of associates."""
Thus, the permissible scope of an automobile search does extend to
any containers, locked or unlocked, that are in an area of the vehicle
that is accessible from inside the passenger compartment. However, at
least when the arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, Belton has not
been interpreted to allow a search of a companion who is also a passen-
ger in the car if there is no independent cause to arrest or search that
passenger.
4. The "Bright Line"
Many courts have demonstrated that it is possible to apply the
Belton bright line in a workable manner that eliminates case-by-case
adjudication of automobile searches made incident to arrest. Addition-
ally, most courts have recognized a distinction between searches that
remain within the Belton rufe and searches that cause the bright line to
break down.
However, some courts have failed to recognize the importance of
the bright line in the Belton decision and have extended Belton-type
searches to other situations. For instance, in one case the court upheld a
Belton-type search at the station house after an arrest. The Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that "[w]e do not think the fact [that]
the car was searched after [being driven] to the station rather than be-
ing searched on the roadside makes Belton inapplicable to this case.""
4
1
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has noted, in the context of the "auto-
mobile exception" to the warrant requirement, that allowing a search
at the station house may provide even greater protection for officers and
evidence because it will eliminate the dangers inherent in a late night
140 See id. at 335-36.
141 762 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985).
142 Id. at 499.
143 State v. Blair, 632 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1982); see also supra
note 101 (citing cases addressing station house searches).
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roadside search.' However, courts that extend Belton beyond "con-
temporaneous" searches fail to recognize and adhere to the rationale for
a Belton-type search.
The reason that vehicle searches that take place while the arrestee
is locked in the patrol car can be considered contemporaneous to the
arrest is completely utilitarian. Police officers need clear-cut rules." 5
No one would argue that all arrestees are likely to free themselves from
their restraints, enter their own vehicles, and gain control of weapons
or destructible evidence. The argument that allows a search made while
the arrestee is in the patrol car is that the patrol car is the nearest
bright line. If, however, the utilitarian rationale of Belton fails, there is
no reason to retain the rule. Thus, extending these rules to include
searches beyond those made at the scene of the arrest both weakens the
bright line rule and serves as an argument for overruling Belton.
If the standard conduct of police reveals that a contemporaneous
search of the automobile at the scene of the arrest is not a practical
alternative, the rule should be replaced. Courts must retain the Belton
bright line to allow contemporaneous searches when both the defendant
and the vehicle are at the scene of the arrest. When the vehicle is
brought to the station house, it should not be searched incident to ar-
rest. If police have probable cause to search a vehicle, it may be
searched under United States v. Ross." 6 If the jurisdiction has inven-
tory regulations, it may be searched under South Dakota v. Opper-
man.147 But stretching the Belton rule to allow any vehicle search re-
gardless of the fact that it is not contemporaneous eviscerates both the
rule itself and the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches.
B. The Belton Stretch: Using the Belton Rule to Authorize
Searches Outside of the Automobile Context
In footnote three of the Belton opinion, Justice Stewart empha-
sized that "[o]ur holding today does no more than determine the mean-
ing of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic context. It
in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel
144 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970).
15 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
213-14 (1979)).
14 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) ("If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that
may conceal the object of the search.").
147 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) ("[I]nventories [of automobiles made] pursuant to
standard police procedures are reasonable.").
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case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial
arrests."" 8 Courts, however, as predicted by the post-Belton criti-
cism, 49 have not been able to confine the decision to the automobile
context. Prosecutors have attempted, often successfully, to rely on Bel-
ton to justify what would otherwise be unconstitutional warrantless
searches in situations in which no automobiles are involved.
Perhaps the most justifiable of these extensions is the inclusion of
searches of the passenger compartment of airplanes.'50 Because the
ccourt can see no difference between the exigent circumstances of a car
and an airplane," the Belton rule has been held applicable to airplanes
by at least two courts.15' This extension, however, is merely sympto-
matic of the difficulty courts have had in confining the decision to the
context for which it was designed. Because courts are often hesitant to
see incriminating evidence excluded because of poor police work, they
are willing to stretch an exception to the warrant requirement so that it
covers the search at hand.' 52
The most egregious extension of the Belton rule has come from the
Fourth Circuit. First, in United States v. Litman,15 3 the Fourth Circuit
interpreted Belton and Chimel to allow, after an arrest, the contempo-
raneous search of a bag that was "within the area in which the defen-
dant might have reached .... ,,154 In Litman, the bag that was
searched was sitting at the defendant's feet and would therefore have
been subject to a search based on the Chimel standard.155 In United
States v. Porter,' however, the court upheld a search of a bag that
was merely "within arm's reach" of the arrestee.117 There was no indi-
cation that it was within the immediate control of the arrestee; rather,
"[t]here was no possibility that the arresting officer would be endanger-
ing himself or risking the loss of evidence by deferring a search of the
148 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
'4 See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
180 Although the cases did not rely on the need for clear-cut rules to guide police
when searching airplanes incident to arrest, it is arguable that such a rule would easily
be applicable to small private planes. A rule could be recognized that allows per se
searches of six- or eight-seat passenger planes incident to the arrest of an occupant.
However, a rule allowing the search of an entire jumbo jetliner incident to the arrest of
one of the dozens of passengers on board would obviously violate the Chimel standard.
1"1 See United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 933 (1983); United States v. Thomas, 536 F. Supp. 736, 743 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
152 See Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to
Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DE PAUL L. REv.
51, 82 (1980).
153 739 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1984).
154 Id. at 139.
155 See id. at 138-39.
186 738 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984).
157 Id. at 624.
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bag until a warrant had been obtained. '158 The court interpreted Bel-
ton to establish a " 'bright-line' rule that a lawful custodial arrest justi-
fies a contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested
and the immediately surrounding area."'59 With the Porter decision,
the court extended the bright line from searches incident to arrests of
occupants of automobiles to searches resulting from Terry stops at
airports.
1 6 0
Moreover, in the same year, the same court indicated that there
was absolutely no limit to the Belton rule by extending it to searches
incident to the arrest of an occupant of a hotel room. In United States
v. Silva, 6 ' the court upheld the seizure of weapons from a locked, zip-
pered bag as incident to the arrest of the defendant. At the time of the
search, both of the arrestees were handcuffed with their hands behind
their backs, and were sitting on the motel room bed. The key to the
locked bag was in defendant Silva's pocket, and the police officer had to
remove the key from the pocket in order to unlock and search the
bag.162 Relying on Belton and Porter, the court held that since the bag
"was in the immediately surrounding area" it could be searched pursu-
ant to the incident to arrest exception. 3
The Eighth Circuit has also relied on Belton to uphold a search of
a hotel room incident to the arrest of an occupant. In United States v.
Palumbo,16 4 police officers seized cocaine that had been taped behind a
dresser drawer. Although the record is unclear concerning whether the
arrestee was handcuffed at the time of the search, the majority did not
believe that such a factual finding was necessary: "[A]ccessibility . . . is
not the benchmark. The question is whether the cocaine was in the
area within the immediate control of the arrestee within the meaning of
Chimel v. California."' 5 Citing Belton, but ignoring the fact that Bel-
ton was confined to the "particular and problematic context" of
automobiles, 66 the court held that the rule defining the permitted
search area "is not constrained because the arrestee is unlikely at the
time of the arrest to actually reach into that area.'1 67 Thus, the major-
ity used Belton to remove any probability requirement from Chimel in
158 Id. at 629 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 627 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
160 For further discussion of the facts of Porter, see infra text accompanying notes
176-77.
1 745 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
162 See id. at 843, 847.
163 Id. at 847.
164 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
115 Id. at 1097.
166 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
1'7 Palumbo, 735 F.2d at 1097 (citing Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60).
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a context beyond that of the automobile search."' 8 Indeed, this court
allowed the bright line from Belton to creep into a hotel room, an area
generally granted protection similar to that given the home."6 9
Not all courts, however, are so willing to eviscerate the distinction
between the bright line rule that applies to automobiles, and a factual
finding of "immediate control" that is required elsewhere. In contrast
to Porter, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina specifically "de-
cline[d] to extend the 'bright-line' Belton approach to arrests outside
the automobile context." 7 In State v. Thomas, as in Porter, the de-
fendant was detained as a result of a Terry stop in an airport. Incident
to his arrest, the agents searched his locked suitcase, which was large
and cumbersome.1 7 ' The court, following United States v. Chadwick,1"
found the search to be unconstitutional. Because luggage has a primary
purpose of being a depository for personal effects, it does not have the
same reduced expectation of privacy that an automobile has, and expec-
tations of privacy are thus greater in luggage than in automobiles. Re-
lying on footnote three of the Belton opinion, the court ruled that the
Belton approach "is properly confined to the automobile context."
17 3
The State of Maryland has also rejected an extension of the Belton
doctrine. In Stackhouse v. State,"4 the state argued that the search of
an attic, executed after the defendant had been removed from the attic,
arrested, and handcuffed on the floor below, should be encompassed
within a broad reading of Belton. The Maryland Court of Appeals
-declined to read Belton so broadly as to extend to searches of a private
home." '
Thus, the application of the Belton decision to situations not in-
volving automobiles, like its application when a defendant is arrested
after exiting a car, has yielded conflicting results. In both Thomas and
Porter, the defendants were stopped and questioned in airports. Both
possessed airplane tickets with incorrect names and were asked to ac-
company an investigator to an office. Both were arrested after indicat-
168 See also United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (al-
lowing a "protective sweep" search of a mobile motor home incident to the arrest of its
driver), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); State v. Camp, 175 Ga. App. 591, 594, 333
S.E.2d 896, 899 (1985) (allowing a search of a motor home bedroom incident to the
arrest of an occupant of another room).
18 See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(b) (1978).
170 State v. Thomas, 81 N.C. App. 200, 213, 343 S.E.2d 588, 595 (1986).
171 See id. at 202, 343 S.E.2d at 589-90.
172 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
17l Thomas, 81 N.C. App. at 213, 343 S.E.2d at 595.
174 298 Md. 203, 468 A.2d 333 (1983).
175 See id. at 211, 468 A.2d at 337; see also United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d
602, 607 n.14 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that Belton applies only to automobile searches
and not to searches on the porch of a house).
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ing that they possessed small amounts of contraband."' 6 In Porter, the
agent searched a carry-on bag that was situated between the agent and
Ms. Porter. The federal court found that Belton justified a search of
packages within the immediate area.1" judge Murnaghan's dissent
noted that Belton was designed specifically for automobiles and did not
apply to a search incident to a lawful arrest in a context apart from an
automobile highway stop. 7 ' This was the position adopted by the
Thomas majority, which went on to note that, absent exigent circum-
stances, Chadwick prohibits the search of luggage or other property
seized at the time of the arrest."' 9 Consequently, two cases with re-
markably similar facts produced conflicting results.
The approach adopted by the Maryland and North Carolina
courts is preferable to that of the Fourth Circuit. Allowing Belton to
authorize searches at airports, hotels, or homes effectively overrules the
Chimel doctrine. Chimel invalidated not only a broad search of the en-
tire house but also a search of the entire room in which the arrestee
was standing.' 80 An interpretation other than a strict confinement of
Belton to the automobile context will reverse that result. The Belton
court specifically rejected such a reversal.' 8'
C. Pretext Searches: The Belton "Free Search" Zone
The risk of police or prosecutorial abuse is one of the most diffi-
cult problems accompanying the propagation of a bright line rule. The
Belton rule lends itself especially to pretextual arrests leading to a
search of the entire passenger compartment of the car. A police officer
with reason to believe that a suspect is concealing contraband in her
vehicle, but with insufficient information to form probable cause, may
simply follow the suspect's car hoping to arrest her for a traffic viola-
tion. i8 2 Likewise, an officer with an arrest warrant may wait until the
suspect opens the door of her vehicle and then search the vehicle. 8 '
Both scenarios represent attempts at an unwarranted extension of the
Belton doctrine.
In State v. Roth,' 4 plainclothes police kept a residence under sur-
178 See Porter, 738 F.2d. at 624; Thomas, 81 N.C. App. at 202-04, 343 S.E.2d at
589-90.
17 See Porter, 738 F.2d at 627.
178 See id. at 627-28 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
179 See Thomas, 81 N.C. App. at 209-13, 343 S.E.2d at 593-95.
180 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 766-68.
181 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
181 See Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983).
183 See United States v. Bautista, 731 F.2d 97, 99 (1st Cir. 1984).
184 213 Neb. 900, 331 N.W.2d 819 (1983).
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veillance for suspected drug sales. After the occupants left the house
and drove to another home, the police enlisted the help of a uniformed
officer to ticket the vehicle for a parking violation. The uniformed of-
ficer saw a marijuana cigarette in plain view in the car, waited for the
suspect to reenter the vehicle, and then arrested him for possession of
marijuana. After the arrest, another uniformed officer was able to join
the first officer in the search of the vehicle. The Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld the search as a valid search incident to arrest. 185
Likewise, in Traylor v. State,'8 6 police officers observed a known
drug dealer sitting in a parked car. They investigated over the radio,
discovered that the suspect's license had been revoked, and then waited
for him to start the car. Once he started to drive, the police arrested
him and searched the entire passenger compartment.
187
The most obvious use of Belton as a pretext to allow a search of
the entire passenger compartment is the situation when police wait un-
til the suspect walks to and opens the door of her car before making an
arrest. In United States v. Garcia,18 the police followed defendant Ste-
phenson's car to a bar and then to an apartment where they suspected
drugs were being sold. They waited for him to leave the apartment and
walk to his vehicle and arrested him as he was "in or just entering his
car."189 By waiting for the arrest to take place in the car, the police
could avail themselves of the Belton rule and search not only the pas-
senger compartment but the briefcase that the police requested that Ste-
phenson remove from the car.
This use of the Belton decision turns the search incident to arrest
exception into an "arrest incident to search", exception. Rather than
protecting the police officer from whatever weapons may be in the car
or briefcase, and rather than thwarting an arrestee's efforts to reach
destructible evidence, this situation unleashes weapons that may be con-
cealed in the vehicle and allows, at the arresting officer's request, the
defendant to have access to the briefcase. This police tactic merely al-
lows the police to discover evidence that otherwise would be accessible
only with a warrant. 90
185 See id. at 902-03, 331 N.W.2d at 822.
186 458 A.2d 1170 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983).
See id. at 1173.
188 785 F.2d 214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Barker v. United States, 106 S.
Ct. 1797 (1986).
189 Id. at 225.
1to See also United States v. Bautista, 731 F.2d 97, 98-99 (1st Cir. 1984) (Police
officials observed the defendant selling cocaine to an informant, watched him walk back
to his car, and arrested him as he entered the car where they suspected that he was
keeping cocaine, thereby opening the entire passenger compartment to a Belton
search.).
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The second type of abuse is prosecutorial. The rationale for the
Belton rule is that police need bright line rules to clarify the limits of
their authority; officers cannot make case-by-case determinations of
whether a particular search is reasonable. This precise need prompted
the Supreme Court to decide that the interior of a vehicle is always
within the reach of an occupant.' Thus, when police are not aware of,
and do not take advantage of, the rule, the rule cannot be said to guide
their conduct. Rather, it merely serves to rescue prosecutors who are
faced with cases of police misconduct.
United States v. Henry'9" provides one such example. There, the
arrest was made as the two defendants were driving away from an inn.
Mistakenly believing that they saw a gun, the officers performed a pre-
liminary search of the vehicle based on probable cause. Subsequent to
the arrest, the officers obtained a warrant to search the car and discov-
ered two thousand dollars in the console. The court refused to address
the contention that the warrant was obtained improperly, holding that
the search could have been executed, pursuant to Belton, incident to
the arrest. 9 '
In Henry, the court simply allowed the exception to swallow the
rationale. The search occurred in 1984, three years after the Belton
decision. Sufficient time had passed to allow the rule to filter through
administrative levels to the officer on the street. The officers discerned
no exigent circumstances that made it necessary for them to search the
console incident to arrest. Indeed, by the time the search occurred, the
defendants were no longer on the scene.' Presumably, the court did
not want to exclude the evidence, nor did it want to approve a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 95 Instead, the court allowed
the prosecution to avoid the fact that the warrant might have been im-
properly obtained by hiding behind an exception designed to protect
evidence and officers. Prosecutors are expected to introduce incriminat-
ing evidence at trial. Likewise, rules should be promulgated to guide
police conduct. However, accepting prosecutors' arguments that an of-
ficer could have relied on a rule designed to guide her in the conduct of
her duties, when she in fact did not rely on that rule, allows prosecu-
tors to act as "Monday morning quarterbacks" to repair blunders made
191 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
192 763 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1985).
193 See id. at 331.
194 See id. at 330.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied "when an officer acting with objective good
faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its
scope," even if the warrant is ultimately found to be invalid).
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by the arresting officer. If this is the purpose that the Belton rule
serves, Belton should be overruled."9 6
CONCLUSION
Both the police and the lower courts need explicit guidance when
determining the proper scope of a search. Without this guidance, the
police are free to regulate themselves, and the lower courts are left to
affirm the ad hoc decisions of individual officers. However, the most
effective rules are not those mandated by the Supreme Court and
passed down to police officers as a result of litigation but those that are
implemented by police departments after careful deliberation.
19 7
In this respect, Belton 98 has failed to satisfy the goals of the pre-
Belton proponents of bright line rules. The Belton search itself was the
result of an ad hoc choice made by Trooper Douglas Nicot. In deciding
to search, he did not have time for careful consideration of the compet-
ing interests of law enforcement and the fourth amendment. The rule
was not the product of public deliberation. Until the case was decided
by the Supreme Court, neither citizens, police, nor courts knew the
legal limits of a search incident to arrest. Indeed, six years after the
decision, many states have not clarified this uncertainty. 99
Additionally, the Belton rule itself does nothing to limit the discre-
tion of the individual officer on the street. It merely authorizes any
officer, in her own discretion, to search a vehicle contemporaneous to
arrest. The only clear-cut rules that place absolute limits on police dis-
cretion are those that require all officers to comply with a certain stan-
dard.200 Those rules are best promulgated by police departments them-
selves, subject to judicial review.201
The fact that the decision failed to satisfy the goals of certain legal
scholars, however, does not necessarily mean that the Belton rule is
without merit. The Supreme Court did not consider the value of public
deliberation and rulemaking when it upheld the Belton search. It
196 See also McGowan, supra note 43, at 678-79 (relating an example of a prose-
cutor's argument having no relationship to the actual needs of the law enforcement
agency).
197 See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 417-29; McGowan, supra note 43, at 676-
94.
198 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
199 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (requiring that all
police officers recite "Miranda" warnings before custodial interrogation).
201 See McGowan, supra note 43, at 674-75; see also United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 220-21 & n.1 (1973) (arrest of defendant made pursuant to departmen-
tal policy requiring arrest for operation of a motor vehicle following revocation of oper-
ator's permit).
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merely clarified-for citizens, for police, and for the courts-that the
United States Constitution does not prohibit a search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile contemporaneous to the arrest of an oc-
cupant. It did not prohibit local police departments from creating rules
and regulations regarding the execution and scope of such a search.
In terms of the goals of the Supreme Court, the Belton rule can be
seen as at least a partial success. Courts have reached a consensus on
the scope of a Belton search,202 and have come to an agreement on the
outer limits of the definition of "contemporaneous." Additionally, some
police departments have been able to rely on this decision to guarantee
that officers understand the limits of their authority.203
In other respects, the decision has failed. Because the arrest in Bel-
ton occurred while the passengers were inside the vehicle, courts have
been unable to rely on the decision when the defendant was arrested
outside of the car. The decision does not tell lower courts why Belton
searches are valid.204 Is it because such searches are always necessarily
within the Chimel'05 "grabbing area?" Is it because a convenient bright
line is available? Or is it because the convenient bright line happened
to be within the scope of Chimel based on the facts of one case?
Subsequent cases must be decided within the limits of both Belton
and Chimel. Although the Court gave the Chimel "grabbing area" a
broad reading in Belton, it reaffirmed the basic principle of the search
incident to arrest exception-that only the arrestee and the area within
her immediate control may be searched. 06 This rationale is supple-
mented by a desire for bright line rules, but those rules must retain
Chimel's protection. Allowing a search of the passenger compartment of
a vehicle, when the occupant exited the vehicle before the arrest, does
not retain that protection. Nor does allowing a vehicle search in such a
situation serve the utilitarian purpose of providing a bright line. There
is no guidepost, other than a clock or a yardstick, that allows a police
officer to distinguish among arrestees who exited their cars one minute
before arrest, five minutes before arrest, or thirty minutes before arrest.
Conversely, limiting Belton searches to automobiles that are occu-
pied at the time of the arrest serves all of the purposes of the Chimel
and Belton decisions. It provides a standard that police can follow in
202 See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
203 Police in Florida, for example, have removed arrestees from their vehicles,
handcuffed them, placed them in the back seat of the patrol car, and then searched the
arrestee's vehicle. See, e.g., Padron v. State, 449 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 1984); Tippins
v. State, 454 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
2 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
2 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
200 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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making search incident to arrest decisions. It distinguishes between
those cases in which an arrestee could possibly gain access to the con-
tents of the vehicle at the time of the arrest and those in which she
could not. Therefore, it protects both the privacy interests of individuals
and the law enforcement interests of the government.
In the context of searches that do not involve automobiles, subse-
quent case law reinforces criticism of the Belton decision. The bright
line is blurry to lower courts. Chimel confines searches to the area from
within which an arrestee might gain control of a weapon or evidence.
However, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted Belton to allow a full
"area" search of the area in which the defendant is arrested, or even of
the area to which the defendant has been taken after arrest.207 It is not
clear, under this interpretation, exactly what type of search is prohib-
ited by Chimel.
Clearly, in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, Belton does not pro-
tect the privacy interests advanced by the Chimel decision. 20 8 However,
because Chimel has not been overruled, neither Belton nor Chimel can
provide any clear-cut guidance to law enforcement officers. If police
make warrantless "area" searches, they violate Chimel. If these cases
are prosecuted, evidence discovered in the search may be introduced
under an expansive reading of Belton. The only purpose that the deci-
sion can serve in that event is to allow prosecutors to correct, post hoc,
the mistakes of police officers. This is an unacceptable use of Belton.20 9
In order to retain the contribution that Belton makes to law en-
forcement, the decision must be read narrowly to apply only to the spe-
cific factual situation of arrests of occupants of automobiles. Expanding
the decision to cover arrests of recent evacuees of vehicles and situations
not involving automobiles merely serves to blur the bright line and cre-
ate an unworkable rule. While the absence of rules may create a fourth
amendment akin to a "Rorschach blot,"'210 the extension of rules to sit-
uations for which they were not designed creates a "blurry impression-
istic pattern." ' Neither is an acceptable model for fourth amendment
jurisprudence.
207 See supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 153-69 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
210 See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 375.
21 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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